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Are Ends Subject to Deliberation in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics?
Anthony Crifasi A Reply to David Wiggins.
University o f  St. Thomas, Houston 
SAGP at APA Eastern Division I
December 28,1998
In his landmark essay, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” David Wiggins 
proposes a certain interpretation o f the Aristotelian notion of deliberation in response to 
an earlier interpretation by D. J. Allan.1 The latter interpretation, as characterized by 
Wiggins, is as follows. In Book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats a restricted 
notion o f deliberation which applies only to productive activities, or means-end scenarios. 
In such cases, only means are deliberated, never ends. In Books 6 and 7, however, 
Aristotle treats a wider sense o f deliberation which is no longer limited to means-end 
cases. Consequently, the notion of deliberation in Book 3 is discontinuous with that in 
Books 6 and 7, so that a further distinction must be imported in order to explain the 
change.
Wiggins, on the other hand, proposes that the notion o f deliberation in Book 3 is in 
fact continuous with that in Books 6-7, in that in all three books, deliberation is not in 
principle limited to means, but can include ends themselves. Any attempt to interpret 
deliberation as in principle restricted to means alone, Wiggins argues, causes internal 
difficulties in Book 3. The reason that deliberation appears to be restricted to only means 
in Book 3 is that Aristotle is taking advantage of the clarity o f purely means-end examples 
o f deliberation in that book in order to prepare the way for the more complex cases in 
Books 6-7, in which ends themselves are subject to deliberation. Thus, although in certain 
cases deliberation happens to entail only a calculation o f the best means towards a fixed 
end, never in principle is deliberation restricted to only such cases, which becomes clear in 
Books 6-7. We can therefore deliberate about ends themselves.
Wiggins begins his argument with a comparison between deliberation and choice. 
Aristotle closely joins deliberation (bouleusis) with choice Iprohairesis), defining choice 
as deliberative desire o f what is in our power (1113al0). Regarding choice, however, 
Aristotle states that it is most closely “bound up with” (oikeiotaton) virtue, and 
discriminates character better than action ( l l l lb 6 -7 ) . From these two considerations, 
Wiggins concludes that choice cannot be “concerned only with means” because if it were, 
then it would be neutral to discriminations between good and bad character, since one 
who aims at a bad end can also be skilled regarding means. So since Aristotle does 
maintain that choice “discriminates character,” then choice (and therefore deliberation) 
must be “a fairly inclusive notion that relates to different specifications o f man’s end,” not 
only to different specifications of the means.2 For this reason, Wiggins translates pros to 
telos as what is towards the end, as opposed to Ross’ translation o f the phrase as means 
towards the end. This also is more inclusive of cases in which what is towards the end is 
not means as opposed to the end, but constituents o f the end itself, as are the virtues in 
relation to happiness.
1 David W iggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” Essays on Aristotle’s  Ethics (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 
221-240.
2 Idib., p. 223.
Wiggins then addresses two problems which arise with his interpretation. First, 
Aristotle states that we do not deliberate about ends (plural). In Wiggins’ account, 
however, since in certain cases what is towards the end constitutes the end itself, and there 
can be many such constituent ends, then in those cases we would indeed deliberate about 
many ends (plural). Secondly, if happiness is constituted by what is towards the end, then 
since deliberation is o f what is towards the end, happiness would be subject to 
deliberation, which Aristotle explicitly prohibits. Wiggins addresses the first difficulty by 
interpreting the texts in which Aristotle prohibits deliberation about ends (plural) to be 
referring not to those cases in which there are many constituent ends, but to those cases in 
which there is only one fixed end. Thus, in those cases, there is no deliberation about ends1. 
The second difficulty, Wiggins argues, is solved by the fact that although there can be no 
deliberation about whether or not to pursue happiness in general, the possibility remains 
that we can deliberate about what specifically constitutes happiness. As Wiggins puts it, “a 
man may seek by deliberation to make more specific and more practically determinate that 
generalized telos o f eudaimonia.”3
On this reading, Wiggins contends that the transition from Book 3 to Book 6 and 7 
is now smooth. From two texts about practical wisdom in Book 6, he argues that 
“practical wisdom in its deliberative manifestations is,” for Aristotle, “concerned both with 
the attainment of particular formed objectives and also with questions o f  general policy - 
what specific objectives to form.”4 The only reason this appears to be discontinuous with 
Book 3 is that in that earlier book, Aristotle used examples o f deliberation in which the 
end was fixed and clear, such as the case o f analyzing a geometrical figure in order to find 
the means o f constructing it. Such examples were used, Wiggins argues, due to their 
clarity, in order to prepare the way for the more complex cases in Book 6, in which the 
end itself is no longer fixed and must be determined. In order to explain this apparent 
discontinuity, D. J. Allan imports a distinction between means-end deliberations and rule- 
case deliberations. Wiggins criticizes this approach due to internal inconsistencies, as well 
as from a text which indicates that, for Aristotle, there are no such general rules.
Having argued the nature o f the transition between Books 3 and 6, Wiggins then 
presents an outline o f a neo-Aristotelian theory o f practical reason, including features such 
as deliberations led not by a determinate end but by “situational appreciation,” and a 
system o f internally competing and incommensurable ends. He then concludes with the 
warning that although the notion of “situational appreciation” explains very little, 
nevertheless more specification is not possible in matters o f action.
Π
Wiggins presents a powerful argument against Allan, through both inconsistencies 
within Allan’s theory and the resulting lack of harmony in the notion o f deliberation 
between Books 3, 6, and 7. Wiggins’ own alternative, however, contains its own 
difficulties, which are left unaddressed. Since his alternative consists in unifying the notion 
o f deliberation in those books into one which is not restricted to means, then these 
difficulties should lead us to consider the third logical alternative - that the notion o f
2
3 Ibid., p. 227.
4 Ibid., P. 228.
deliberation is unified in all three books as one which is restricted to means. In order to 
make this case, it will therefore be necessary to address Wiggins’ contention that any 
interpretation which restricts deliberation to means alone produces internal problems in 
Book 3, as well as his contention that Books 6-7 clearly deal with a notion of deliberation 
which includes ends, not just means.
First, Wiggins argues that since, according to Aristotle, choice “discriminates 
character,” then choice (and therefore deliberation) must be “a fairly inclusive notion that 
relates to different specifications of man’s end,” not only to different specifications o f the 
means.5 Is it necessarily the case, however, that if choice and deliberation are, as Wiggins 
characterizes the opposing position, “concerned only with means” that then they cannot 
“relate to different specifications of man’s end?” The specific manner in which choice and 
deliberation are “concerned” with means is as their object (1112b35, 1113b4). Choice and 
deliberation could therefore also be “concerned” with the end, not necessarily as their 
object or as what is chosen, but as that for the sake o f which what is chosen is chosen. 
Accordingly, choice and deliberation could be “concerned only with means” (that is, as 
their object) and still “relate to different specifications o f man’s end” (that is, as to that fo r  
the sake o f which). Choice would then, as Aristotle says, “discriminate character better 
than action,” since actions would be good or bad depending on the reason they were 
chosen, not necessarily on the choice o f that reason itself.
Wiggins, however, finds this interpretation o f Aristotle to be intrinsically 
implausible, since it seems absurdly obvious that we can in fact deliberate about ends. He 
argues, for example, that although Aristotle does state that a doctor does not deliberate 
about whether or not to heal, this does not mean that we could not deliberate about 
whether to be a doctor in the first place. Wiggins puts this very strongly:
It is absurd to suppose that a man could not deliberate about whether to be a doctor or 
not; and very nearly as absurd to suppose that Aristotle, even momentarily w hile writing 
Book 3, supposed that nobody could deliberate this question. It is so absurd that it is 
worth asking whether the phrase deliberating about the end or deliberating about 
happiness is ambiguous.6
Wiggins appears to be arguing that the interpretation which restricts deliberation to means 
must attribute to Aristotle the position that we cannot deliberate about whether or not to 
be a doctor (or any other occupation), which is clearly absurd.
It is so clearly absurd, however, that it is worth asking whether or not that 
characterization o f Aristotle does indeed follow necessarily from the position that we do 
not deliberate about ends. A clue may be found in Aristotle’s notion o f subordinate ends, 
according to which ends that fall under higher ends are pursued for the sake o f those 
higher ends (1094a7-18). This distinction furnishes us with the tools we need in order to 
reconcile the position that we do not deliberate about ends with the obvious fact that we 
can deliberate about whether or not to be a doctor. Accordingly, there could be 
deliberation about whether or not to be a doctor, but only insofar as it is “for the sake o f ’ 
some further end, not insofar as it is itself an end. Insofar as it is an end, there would be
3
5 Ibid., p. 223.
6 Ibid., p. 226.
deliberation only about means towards it (i.e., the best means for producing health). Once 
the choice is made to be a doctor, one can o f course at some point deliberate once again 
whether or not to be a doctor, but only insofar as its status as the best means towards 
some further end is being reconsidered. It therefore does not follow that if  only means 
were subject to deliberation, then ordinary deliberations such as whether or not to be a 
doctor would be impossible.
Another difficulty arises from the reconciliation proposed by Wiggins between his 
interpretation o f  deliberation as applying to ends, and Aristotle’s statement that happiness 
is not subject to  deliberation (111lb30). According to Wiggins, although there can be no 
deliberation about whether or not to pursue happiness, the possibility remains o f 
deliberating about what practically speaking happiness is, or what constitutes happiness. 
This reconciliation would be consistent with the text o f Aristotle but for one item - 
Wiggins concedes that there also can be no deliberation about whether to pursue health, 
since Aristotle explicitly lists it together with happiness ( ll llb 2 7 -3 0 ). The difficulty is 
that Wiggins had proposed the following explanation for why there can be no deliberation 
about whether to pursue happiness:
. . .i f  the desirability o f eudaimonia were really up for debate, then nothing suitable by
way o f practical or ethical concern or by way o f desire would be left over (outside the
ambit o f eudaimonia itself) to settle the matter.7
Thus, we cannot deliberate about whether to pursue happiness precisely because there is 
no ethical concern or desire which is not subsumed under happiness, and therefore nothing 
outside o f happiness by which it could be judged regarding its worthiness for pursuit. This 
explanation cannot be applied to health, however, since there are “practical and ethical 
concerns” and “desires” outside the ambit o f health. Indeed, for Aristotle the decision to 
forego health is sometimes the right one. For example, there are some actions which are so 
heinous that one should rather die than perform them, even under duress (1110a27). 
Further, death in battle is, for Aristotle not only noble, but the most noble o f all (1115a25- 
35). Consequently, if the reason there can be no deliberation about whether to pursue 
happiness is that there is no ethical concern outside o f happiness, then according to this 
line of thought, we should be able to deliberate about whether to pursue health. 
Accordingly, Wiggins’ explanation that health is an undeliberable end because, for 
Aristotle, it is “an undetachable part o f the end for human beings,” is insufficient.8 
According to Wiggins’ own reasoning, this “part” o f the end can conflict with other 
“parts,” such as bravery, and therefore can be deliberated against them regarding its very 
pursuit, not merely its “specification” and “practical determination.” Thus, under Wiggins’ 
reasoning, the fact that Aristotle lists health along with happiness is inexplicable.
Under the notion that deliberation is limited to means, however, the difficulty 
disappears, since both health and happiness would be undeliberable in the same sense - as 
ends. Although one (happiness) is the ultimate end, while the other is a limited end and is 
therefore also for the sake o f a higher end (1097b 1-6), nevertheless insofar as each is an 
end, each is not deliberated. All o f Aristotle’s examples o f undeliberated ends would then
4
7 Ibid., p. 226.
8 Ibid., p. 227.
be undeliberable in the very same sense, including the doctor’s end o f making people 
healthy, the orator’s end o f persuading, and the statesman’s end o f enacting good laws 
(1112bl2-15). Under this explanation, it is therefore perfectly understandable that 
Aristotle lists health along with happiness as an undeliberable end, since the fact that one is 
never deliberated while the other is sometimes deliberated is irrelevant to the fact that both 
are undeliberable insofar as they are ends.
Further difficulties present themselves in Wiggins’ reading o f two texts from Book 
6 o f the Nicomachean Ethics, from which he argues that the deliberation o f ends is 
explicitly allowed by Aristotle:
...it  is thought to be the mark of a man o f practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well 
about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about 
what sorts o f thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts o f things 
conduce to the good life in general (poia pros to eu zen hotos). (1140a24-28, Ross 
translation, used by W iggins)
The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of 
aim ing in accordance with calculation at the best for man o f things attainable by action.
Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only - it must also recognize 
particulars. (1141b8-18, Ross)
From these texts, Wiggins concludes that practical wisdom is concerned with not only “the 
attainment o f particular formed objectives,” but also “questions o f general policy - what 
specific objectives to form.”9
It is difficult to see the basis for this particular interpretation in the texts cited. The 
distinction made by Aristotle in the first text above appears to be not between the 
attainment o f objectives and the formation o f objectives, but rather between the attainment 
of more limited objectives, such as health and strength, and the attainment o f more 
universal objectives, the most universal o f all being the good life in general. Accordingly, 
Aristotle would merely be stating that a mark o f one who has practical wisdom is the 
ability to recognize the best means towards the highest ends o f human life, not merely the 
best means towards more limited ends, such as health and strength. Practical wisdom (and 
therefore deliberation) would then be specifically concerned with means as its object, not 
with “what specific objectives to form,” although it must indeed be “concerned” with the 
highest objectives as that fo r  the sake o f which.
Regarding the second text cited by Wiggins above, his reading o f ‘universals’ as 
“what specific objectives to form” becomes clearly questionable when we consider the 
immediate context, in which Aristotle cites specific examples:
.. .if  a man knew universally that light meats are digestible and healthy but did not know 
what kinds o f meats are light, he would not produce health, but a man who knows that 
chicken is light and healthy is more likely to produce health. Now prudence is 
concerned with actions; so we should have both kinds o f knowledge, or else the latter 
rather than the former, which is universal. (1141M 8-23, Apostle trans.)
9 Ibid., p. 228.
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In this analogy with health, the example of a ‘universal’ is that light meats are digestible 
and healthy, and the example o f a ‘particular’ is that chicken is light and healthy. Both o f 
these are useful and expedient for attaining the end o f health, although the particular is 
more useful, since it specifies an actual action which can be undertaken (i.e., eating 
chicken). In this text, then, the distinction between particular and universal is not between 
“the attainment o f particular formed objectives” and “what specific objectives to form,” 
but rather between a general knowledge o f what kind o f means should be used (light 
meats), and a more particular knowledge of a specific means (chicken), which can be 
immediately acted upon. Both are expedient means toward the end o f health, not the 
formation of the end or objective itself.
m
Although the exposition o f a neo-Aristotelian theory o f practical wisdom in the 
third section o f Wiggins’ essay contains several important and questionable interpretations 
o f happiness in general, such as the particular notion o f incommensurability used by him, 
we have chosen to focus upon the difficulties involved in his prior interpretation o f 
deliberation, since these form the basis for his later analyses. One important assumption in 
his essay, however, is worthy of note. Wiggins grounds his thesis that ends are subject to 
deliberation upon the view that the various virtues are constituents o f happiness.10 As 
constituents o f the ultimate end itself, they would not be ordered to any higher end. 
Consequently, the virtues would be incommensurable with one another, since conflicts 
between virtues would not be resolvable in terms o f any common end. It is perfectly 
understandable that under this view the sole arbiter o f such conflicts would be “situational 
appreciation,” as Wiggins emphasizes.
Given that the proponents o f this interpretation o f eudaimonia are largely critical o f 
the ancient and medieval tradition regarding the interpretation o f Aristotelian philosophy, 
it is not surprising that we find a member o f that tradition, Aquinas, presenting an 
alternative interpretation of the Aristotelian notion o f eudaimonia in his commentary on 
the Nicomachecm Ethics. This alternative not only renders so-called “incommensurable” 
conflicts much more rational, but also is much more in keeping with Aristotle’s comments 
concerning happiness in Book 10 o f the Nicomachecm Ethics, as well as Book 7 o f the 
Politics. Since a complete explication o f this alternative is beyond the scope o f this essay, 
we will present it in sketch form, in order to at least indicate its status as an attractive 
alternative.
In Book 10 o f the Nicomachecm Ethics, Aristotle states that perfect happiness is 
activity in accordance with not just any virtue, but the highest virtue (1 177al2-17). This 
virtue is contemplative wisdom, or contemplation o f the highest objects (1177al8-21, 
1141a20), since this is the activity o f the highest or “divine” part o f us (1177al6, 
1178a23), the activity which is most self-sufficient (1177a33-1177bl), and not loved for 
anything else (1177b2-4). These were precisely the criteria given by Aristotle for 
happiness in Book 1 (1097a35-bl, 7-15). The other virtues, however, are happiness in a 
secondary way (1178a9) since they are activities o f the parts in us which are not “divine”
10 Ibid., p. 224. See J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” Essays on Aristotle ’s Ethics, (Berkeley, 
1980), pp. 15-34.
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(1178al0-22), not self-sufficient (1177a30-33), and are loved also for something else 
(1177M7-18). Consequently, virtues other than contemplative wisdom would be desirable 
both in themselves and for something else, and therefore would not be perfect happiness 
(1097a33-35).
Accordingly, conflicts between virtues would not result in the radical 
incommensurability described by Wiggins (having no common end at all). Such a highest 
end would by no means be a “universal rule” in the sense criticized by Wiggins in his reply 
to Allan, since particular circumstances could, as always, affect or prevent altogether the 
manner and means by which the end would be actualized. The “situational appreciation” o f 
practical wisdom would therefore still play a vital role in the practical actualization o f any 
virtue. Since the benefits o f this interpretation include the elimination o f radical 
incommensurability without appeal to universal Kantian “rules,” as well as the unification 
o f Book 10 with Books 1, 3, 6, and 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics and Book 7 o f the 
Politics, its status as a viable alternative is worthy o f consideration.
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